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to Make Savings  
Count
In advanced economies, the vast majority of savings are intermediated 
through formal financial instruments. This intermediation can take one 
of three forms: direct financing, with individuals holding instruments 
issued directly by firms or the government; through institutional inves-
tors who then invest in those instruments; or through formal financial 
intermediaries such as banks. By contrast, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, much of the savings of households does not go through 
the formal financial system. Some households—typically the less 
wealthy—keep savings in unregulated institutions, buy durables or 
other assets as a means to save, or simply stash their cash in the pro-
verbial mattress. Others—typically more wealthy households—hold 
assets abroad or invest in real estate, bypassing the domestic financial 
system entirely.
Latin American and Caribbean financial systems lack depth and 
pose serious constraints to access credit.1 Restricted credit is the other 
side of the coin of low savings in formal financial instruments or institu-
tions. Indeed, as Levine’s (2005) comprehensive review of finance and 
development makes clear, financial systems have five closely interre-
lated roles: to produce information ex ante about possible investments 
and allocate capital to them; to monitor investments and exert corporate 
governance after providing finance; to facilitate the trading, diversifica-
tion and management of risk; to mobilize and pool savings; and to ease 
the exchange of goods and services. 2
This chapter focuses on financial intermediation and mainly on 
the fourth role: to mobilize and pool savings. It asks why in Latin 





In Financial Systems, Small Is Not Beautiful
An efficient financial system should promote savings by providing easy 
and convenient access to appropriate savings instruments offered by 
high-quality, trustworthy institutions at reasonable cost. Clearly, there 
is no single optimal design for a financial system; many potential instru-
ments and structures of financial systems may be equally efficient.3 
Comparing the very different financial systems of successful, advanced 
economies with different savings rates and deep financial systems con-
firms this point.
In some systems (such as the United States and the United Kingdom), 
direct financing through capital markets is relatively more important. 
Firms issue equities and bonds, which are bought by individuals or by 
institutional investors that pool the savings of individuals. In other coun-
tries, such as Germany and Japan, financial intermediaries, including 
banks, are relatively more important. They offer savings accounts and 
provide financing to firms. Banks play a critical role in allocating capital 
and in guiding the corporate governance of firms through represen-
tation on boards. Financial systems dominated by capital markets are 
often characterized as having “arms-length” financing because equity 
market valuations—and at the limit, hostile takeovers—play a disciplining 
role, as opposed to the more direct monitoring role played by financial 
institutions in systems dominated by banks.4 However, in all advanced 
economies with deep financial systems, both direct financing and finan-
cial intermediaries exist; the question is not so much one or the other but 
the balance between the two and the precise and more subtle roles that 
each may play.5
In Latin America and the Caribbean, banks have tended to dominate 
the financial landscape, although capital markets have been grow-
ing. Most individuals do not buy equities or bonds directly, but rather 
hold them indirectly through mutual funds, pension funds, or insurance 
companies. The size of these institutional investors in the region has 
increased, and they are now very significant players in some countries.
Most financial savings in the region are held in banks and other 
financial institutions. On average, the deposits of banks exceed the 
total assets held by pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance compa-
nies combined in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Figure 3.1). The 
financial depth in the typical country in Latin America and the Caribbean 
lags far behind countries like the United States, with its expansive array 
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of institutional investors, and Germany, where banks are relatively much 
larger, and even the Republic of Korea where banks and institutional 
investors are roughly on a par.
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Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from Bebczuk (2015b).
Note: Data on assets rather than liabilities are used for mutual funds and pension funds, as these are 
the data available on a comparative basis. The figures have been adjusted for double-counting (as 
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies may hold bank deposits, and banks may pur-
chase mutual funds) as data sources allow, although it is possible that some may remain. For details, 
see Bebczuk (2015b).
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Countries vary considerably in the region in terms of the manage-
ment of deposits and assets (see Figure 3.1). For example, in Brazil, the 
mutual fund industry has grown considerably and has assets under man-
agement approaching total banking sector deposits. In Chile, pension 
fund assets exceed bank deposits, and the sum of insurance company 
and mutual fund assets is close behind. Mexico has a large corporate 
bond market. These assets are typically held by pension funds and 
mutual funds, which together rival the amount held in bank deposits. 
And in Colombia, pension fund assets under management are almost 
comparable to the deposits of banks.
 How are financial systems in the region likely to change as capi-
tal markets grow?6 More capital market-based financial systems tend to 
promote transparency and information, which is generally considered 
a benefit. On the other hand, they may also promote greater instability. 
Writing in 2002 before the global financial crisis about a similar phenom-
enon in continental Europe, Rajan and Zingales (2003) warn about this 
trade-off. Still, Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced signifi-
cant economic instability in its past, despite having a more bank-based 
financial system; indeed, as a result, the region has improved banking 
and capital market supervision and has been extremely conservative in 
its regulation of more exotic financial instruments. This approach surely 
helped the region survive the recent global financial crisis relatively well 
(Powell, 2015). It may also allow the region to transition to a more mar-
ket-based system while maintaining financial stability.
A related question is whether as capital markets grow they will 
take over from intermediaries—or, in other words, whether capital mar-
kets are substitutes or complements to financial institutions.7 Given the 
changing landscape and the diversity in the region, Latin America and 
the Caribbean provides fertile ground to analyze this question. A novel 
analysis suggests that for Latin America and the Caribbean—as for the 
rest of the world—banks and capital market institutional investors are 
complements, rather than substitutes.8 What this means is that banks 
and capital markets have been growing together. Capital markets are 
not taking over from banks, although both grow more quickly in some 
countries than others. The region appears to be no different from the 
rest of the world in this regard.
For capital markets to grow, ultimately outside investors must feel 
comfortable either buying debt-type instruments or investing in equity 
issued by firms. In turn, this requires a set of conditions to be met. 
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Good information regarding firms’ activities must be available. Finan-
cial accounts must be meaningful and transparent, which in turn means 
that auditors are doing their job and are being sanctioned if they don’t. 
Rating agencies should be operating effectively; this saves individual 
investors the work of analyzing every firm, which would be prohibitively 
costly. Corporate governance should be effective so that outside equity 
or bond investors do not feel they will be taken advantage of by an inside 
group of equity holders.9
Latin America and the Caribbean typically scores rather poorly on 
these important aspects of what might be referred to as the plumb-
ing that allows finance to flow freely from investors to users. This may 
be one reason why financial markets have remained small to date, and 
why financial intermediaries, particularly banks, continue to dominate. 
Indeed, one of the roles of financial intermediaries is precisely to “rep-
resent” small investors, given their likely lack of influence on firms.10 
Financial intermediaries may then play a very important role in increas-
ing the quantity of financial savings. But in order to do this, they must 
build solid reputations so that investors feel comfortable entrusting 
them with what may be their life savings. They must also offer conve-
nience and appropriate instruments with a reasonable return.
Despite recent growth, banking systems in the region remain 
relatively small compared to GDP, especially compared to other bank-
dominated systems. Macroeconomic instability and weak creditor rights 
are frequently cited as underlying barriers to greater financial depth.11 
While the median banking system in the region has grown to have 
almost 40 percent of GDP in deposits, this remains much lower than 
the banking system of the median OECD and Southeast Asian economy. 
Moreover, as the region contains a number of smaller economies, the 
absolute size of financial systems in the region is considerably smaller 
than that of comparators. The median banking system in the OECD has 
some $300 billion in deposits compared to only $15 billion in deposits in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Figure 3.2).
Large financial systems have two very important advantages. The 
first is economies of scale, which allow large banks to operate with 
low margins.12 This can mean higher returns for savers and lower costs 
for borrowers—unless the rents are captured by bankers. The second 
advantage is that such systems can mobilize large amounts of financ-
ing for big projects; they can overcome problems of indivisibility. Large 
projects may require considerable financing, which may be a constraint 
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in some countries that lack large financial intermediaries.13 The impact of 
scale on costs is considered in more depth in Chapter 11.
Formal vs. Informal Saving: Quality Counts
How financial intermediaries operate determines not only the quantity 
of savings, but also the quality. To increase the quality of savings, the 
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intermediary should be fully integrated into the country’s financial sys-
tem. This ensures that the savings are allocated efficiently, which in turn 
allows them to offer better returns. Institutions should also be regulated 
appropriately and should have a high standard of corporate governance 
so that capital can be allocated efficiently.
The previous section focused on formal financial markets and formal 
financial intermediaries. But in Latin America and the Caribbean, savings 
through more informal mechanisms make up a sizable part of the finan-
cial assets of many households. On average, 48 percent of households in 
the region report some savings (Figure 3.3, panel a), and 45 percent say 
they have an account in a formal financial institution, but only 16 percent 
report saving in formal institutions (panel b), according to data collected 
by the World Bank’s FINDEx dataset.14 These averages put Latin Amer-
ica on the level of Sub-Saharan Africa (a region with significantly lower 
income per capita) and pale in comparison to Advanced Economies and 
Emerging Asia (see Figure 3.3).
Where does the rest of the savings go? A fraction is channeled 
through informal financial institutions. In fact, considering both formal 
and informal financial institutions, the composition of Latin America 
and the Caribbean’s financial systems is complex. Most countries have 
a large number of small, cooperative-type financial institutions. On top 
of this, other types of institutions, including nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), provide financial services. Microfinance institutions have 
grown considerably in several countries of the region, and some of them 
also offer deposit-like instruments (Trujillo and Navajas, 2014). Typically, 
these smaller institutions operate only in a particular locality or region, 
and may not be highly integrated into countries’ financial systems.15 Since 
relatively poor households save using these alternatives, the aggregate 
amount of deposits in these institutions may be smaller than deposits at 
formal banks; however, they are very significant in terms of the number 
of accounts and the savings portfolios of those poorer households. If 
savings are highly dispersed—in either small formal or informal financial 
institutions—and not pooled, then they may not be allocated in the most 
efficient manner. In turn, the returns offered to savers may be low, reduc-
ing the total amount of savings.16
As panel a of Figure 3.4 shows, there are 604 commercial banks in 
20 countries in the region, with deposits amounting to about 42 percent 
of GDP. Almost 2,000 non-bank regulated financial institutions hold 
about 2 percent of GDP in deposits, and around 4,000 non-regulated 
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institutions hold a further 2.2 percent of GDP in deposits. Among the 
non-bank regulated financial institutions, 10 development banks and 
14 investment banks have total deposits of 0.2 percent of GDP (panel 
Figure 3.3 Financial Inclusion by Region
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Source: World Bank, Global Financial Inclusion Database (FINDEx). 
Note: All measures are simple country averages. Panel a, Save any money in the past year: Denotes the 
percentage of respondents who report saving or setting aside any money in the past 12 months (per-
cent of respondents age 15+). Panel b, Account at a financial institution: Denotes the percentage of 
respondents who report having an account (by themselves or together with someone else) at a bank 
or another type of financial institution (see year-specific definitions for details) (percent of respon-
dents, age 15+). Panel c, Saved at a financial institution: Denotes the percentage of respondents who 
report saving or setting aside any money at a bank or another type of financial institution in the past 
12 months (see year-specific definitions for details) (percent of respondents, age 15+). See endnote 3 
of Chapter 2 for the list of countries in each country group. 
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b). There are 116 microfinance institutions (MFIs); 1,413 cooperatives; 14 
mutual funds; and 104 credit unions. Together, their deposits amount 
to about 1 percent of GDP, on average. The non-regulated institutions 
are mostly cooperatives (almost 3,000 of the 4,000 non-regulated 
institutions in the sample); their deposits amount to 1.4 percent of GDP. 
Deposits among the remaining non-regulated institutions account for 
0.8 percent of GDP.
In addition, households may be saving in the form of non-financial 
assets, ranging from jewelry and consumer goods, such as refrigerators 
and cars, to houses and other property. They turn to these alternatives for 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Trujillo and Navajas (2014).
Notes:Panel a: vertical axis shows percentage of total. Figures inside first column show savings as 
percentage of GDP, simple average across countries in the region. Figures inside second column show 
the total number of institutions. Panel b: Bubble size illustrates the average of savings as percent of 
GDP, simple average across countries.
MFI = Microfinancial Institutions.
NBFI = Non-Bank Financial Institutions. Include: Financial companies/corporations, mortgages institu-
tions, trust companies, private financial fund in Bolivia, off-shore entities in Guatemala, SOFOMERs 
(Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Múltiple entidades reguladas) in Mexico, saving and lending soci-
ety, rural financial Institutions, IFEs (Instituciones Financieras Externas) in Uruguay.
Non-Bank Regulated Institutions include: Development and investment banks, NBFI, MFI, coopera-
tives, mutuals and credit unions.
GDP series used: 2013 GDP in current US$ (Source: WDI).
Countries included: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Republica Do-
minicana and Uruguay. Bahamas and venezuela excluded due to lack of complete data.
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a number of reasons. They may lack documentation to open an account; 
they may live far away from a financial institution; opening or servicing 
an account may be too expensive; or they may simply lack information or 
trust in financial institutions. In countries where people tend to mistrust 
the financial system—either because a history of relatively high inflation 
has eroded the real value of savings, or banking crises have wiped out 
financial savings—savers may seek to protect the real value of their sav-
ings by investing in assets with a better track record as a store of value.17 
In the case of Argentina, a substantial portion of savings is channeled 
through the real estate market (see Box 3.1).
Saving in real estate is more common among high-income house-
holds. As Chapter 2 noted, poor households rely heavily on informal 
saving strategies, which include keeping money at home or with fam-
ily/friends, saving groups, providing loans to other individuals, buying 
and holding jewelry and other assets, and investing in family businesses. 
The use of these mechanisms is especially common among households 
that in turn are more likely to be excluded from formal financial systems. 
Again, while these forms of saving may not constitute a large part of 
total national savings, they can be an important component of the sav-
ings portfolio of individual households.
Poor and middle-income households in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru are 
more likely to make monthly deposits into informal saving instruments 
than use bank accounts or other formal instruments, according to data 
collected through targeted financial surveys (see Chapter 2).In Mexico 
and Peru, 20 percent and 33 percent of all surveyed households report 
saving through a variety of informal mechanisms, while 14 percent and 
30 percent of them save using bank accounts, respectively. In Brazil, on 
the other hand, the saving rate is low irrespective of the instrument: only 
4 percent of the surveyed households save informally, while 10 percent 
of them do so formally. Preliminary evidence from Colombia reveals a 
pattern similar to that in Mexico and Peru:18 of the 16.5 percent of peo-
ple who reported saving in 2013, only 25 percent saved through formal 
instruments.
Figure 3.5 shows how savings are distributed in Mexico, Peru, and 
Brazil by saving instrument and portfolio among those who save and hold 
positive savings stocks.19 Several patterns are clear. First, the vast major-
ity of surveyed households that save informally in these three countries 
do so mostly through family, friends, savings groups, or loans to oth-
ers, and much less by buying assets for the home or business. Second, 
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BOX 3.1.  ARGENTINA’S RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE SECTOR: A MAGNET 
FOR SAVINGSa
In the context of high macroeconomic volatility, residential real estate has 
been a popular investment for savers. After the financial crisis of 2001–02, in 
which the government and many private institutions restructured debts, and 
many financial contracts were switched from dollars to pesos, Argentines in-
creasingly channeled their savings toward real estate.
As shown in Figure B3.1, from 1992 until 2000, term deposits at banks rose 
by an average of $7.6 billion per year, while from 2003 until 2012 they rose 
an average of only $2.2 billion per year, a 70 percent reduction. On the other 
hand, new savings channeled to real estate soared 78 percent (these figures 
are in constant US dollars of 2014). During the first period, for each dollar that 
went to real estate, about six dollars went to new term deposits. During the 
second period, for each dollar that went to real estate, only 99 cents went to 
new term deposits.
In the city of Buenos Aires, while saving flows into real estate were about 
8.4 percent of total savings from 1992 to 2001, they rose to more than 13.3 
percent of savings in the 2003–2012 period, a 57 percent rise in the ratio (see 
Figure B3.2).
Moreover, the real estate market absorbed 27 percent more square meters 
comparing the decade from 2003–2012 with that of 1992 to 2001. How did the 
real estate market react? Cruces (2016) finds that real rental rates fell signifi-
(continued on next page)
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Note: This figure compares the flow of new savings channeled to real estate with that chan-
neled to banks’ term deposits. Flows into real estate only pertain to the City of Buenos Aires, 
while the increase in time deposits corresponds to the whole banking sector of the country. As 
a reference, the City of Buenos Aires accounted for about one-quarter of national GDP during 
both periods. All figures are in constant 2014 dollars.
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households that save formally use saving accounts and employee pay-
check accounts, but not other financial instruments that can provide 
higher long-term returns, such as fixed-term deposits and mutual funds 
(the total share of long-term saving instruments among households 
cantly to adjust supply and demand: the net rental rates fell from an average 
of 7.1 percent from 1992 until 2001 to a low of 2.7 percent since 2003. At the 
end of the sample, the net rental yield was just 1.5 percent per annum.
The net rental yield on housing can be compared to the returns on al-
ternative investments to estimate the efficiency loss (opportunity cost) from 
the money sunk in real estate. A reasonable range of return for infrastructure 
investment for example would be 5 to 15 percent (see Campos, Serebrisky, 
and Suárez-Alemán, 2015). Using this benchmark implies an efficiency loss 
of between $0.8 and $3 billion dollars per year. The higher end of this range 
amounts to a loss of 2.5 percent of Buenos Aires city’s GDP per year. While it 
may make sense to channel so much savings to real estate from the individual 
investor’s standpoint, it is inefficient for the society as a whole.34
a This box draws from Cruces (2016).
b There are multiple caveats that come with this exercise. For starters, it is assumed that the 
entire stock of new housing was offered for rental. This is not necessarily the case. If people 
build new homes to occupy them, or to sell then to new occupants, then that has a subjective 
value to the owner. This notwithstanding, clearly rental rates went down because the market 
could not absorb all the new stock of housing. The analysis suggests substantial amounts of 
resources obtain very low yields in the real estate sector, while financing for productive invest-
ments is in short supply.
BOX 3.1. (continued)
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saving formally is less than 0.5 percent). Third, households that save 
using both formal and informal instruments are the smallest group of 
savers in each country.20 Moreover, the portfolios of those households 
that do use both types of instruments also tend to favor informal saving 
instruments.
The pattern of saving choices among households in Latin Amer-
ica is very different from a textbook model whereby households save, 
deposit those savings in banks or other financial intermediaries, which 
in turn allocate those savings to those in the economy that need the 
funds to invest. But how different is Latin America from other regions 
in this respect? In order to address this question, the flow of funds of 
households in a subset of countries in Latin America and in a comparator 
group of developing countries outside the region was tracked.
The flow of funds analysis separates the sources and uses of house-
holds’ funds. Households receive funds from either “borrowing” or 
“saving.” In turn, households use those funds to either “acquire financial 
assets” or “to invest directly;” for example buying physical (capital) goods 
for the household/family firm, or investing in a residential dwelling.21
A few interesting patterns emerge and are displayed in Figure 
3.6. First, in terms of sources of funds, on average households in Latin 
America rely more on their own funds (savings) than on external funds 
Figure 3.5 Portfolio of Savings among Low- and Middle-Income Households
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Base of Pyramid (BoP) Survey.
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(borrowing from banks or other sources). Roughly 60 percent of total 
available household funds come from their own savings compared to 
50 percent among comparators (panel a). On the other hand, on aver-
age, households in Latin America invest approximately 40 percent of 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on national accounts data from each country. 
Notes: Computed as simple averages by country over the period 2005–2009.
a “Financial deposits” includes cash holding (for countries where deposits can be separated from cash 
holdings, the share of cash in the significantly smaller than deposits);
b “Equity” includes direct ownership of firms, equity securities and shares in mutual funds;
c “Other financial assets” is computed as a residual of “Net acquisition of financial assets” and the 
other sub-accounts. 
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their funds directly in physical assets (mostly residential investments) 
and acquire financial assets with about 60 percent. Among the compar-
ator group, the split is 35 to 65.
Second, within the category of “net acquisition of financial assets,” 
the financial portfolios in Latin America tilt more toward instruments that 
are not necessarily intermediated by the formal financial system. Panel 
b shows the distribution of total net acquisition of financial assets. 22 In 
Latin America, average financial deposits account for approximately 34 
percent of total purchases of financial assets, compared to more than 50 
percent among the comparators. By contrast, “equity” accounts for 22 
percent of the total net acquisition of financial assets in Latin America, 
compared to 10 percent in the comparator group. This category includes 
direct ownership of (family) firms, which is a non-intermediated financial 
asset, and which makes up the bulk of the account in those countries for 
which there are data. 23 Therefore, on top of allocating a smaller share 
of funds to purchasing financial assets compared to households in the 
comparator group, households in Latin America are much more likely to 
select financial instruments that are not formally intermediated.
The regional averages, however, hide much heterogeneity across 
countries. For example, in Chile, which has the deepest financial system 
in the region, 50 percent of funds are channeled into financial depos-
its and other financial instruments, while only 9 percent goes toward 
equity. In Ecuador, which has a smaller financial system relative to the 
size of its economy, only 25 percent of funds are channeled into financial 
instruments, and 32 percent go into equity assets. More funds appear 
to be intermediated in Chile than in other countries in the region, where 
funds tend to be used more for direct investments. Chile more closely 
resembles a country like the Republic of Korea in the comparator group. 
For the other four Latin American countries, a significantly smaller frac-
tion is intermediated through financial deposits and other financial 
instruments.
Mexico provides an interesting country to analyze in more 
detail. National saving (as a percent of GDP) is reasonably high given 
income per capita, and household savings constitute some 50 percent 
of the national total. Most of that savings, however, is not intermedi-
ated through the formal financial system (Székely, Mendoza, and Karver, 
2015) When “financial saving” is decomposed into financial deposits, 
acquisition of fixed assets, and the purchase of durable goods, depos-
its (both through formal and informal financial institutions) represents 
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less than 10 percent of saving, while the purchase of durable goods rep-
resents nearly three-quarters of all saving. The household saving rate 
(defined as a residual between disposable incomes and consumption) 
increases from 8.1 to 21.7 percent when durable goods are considered a 
form of saving rather than consumption (that is, when consumption of 
durables is excluded from consumption).
A high share of savings that is not channeled through an integrated 
formal financial system suggests that resources are being poorly 
allocated. An interesting question is why these savings are not inter-
mediated. If the reason is “lack of demand” for formal instruments, i.e., 
due to lack of access, poor information or mistrust in financial insti-
tutions, then the household may benefit considerably by improving 
access, financial literacy or trust (see Chapter 9 for more on informa-
tion and trust).
This chapter focuses on the issue of lack of supply, or access. If many 
households live far from a formal financial institution, then factoring 
the costs of travel and time may encourage each individual household 
to save in an informal instrument even if that instrument pays little in 
terms of private returns. That informal saving instrument may have very 
little social return as well, as it may not lead to a very productive invest-
ment opportunity. In this case, if a sudden change in access occurs—for 
example, a local bank branch opens or mobile banking becomes avail-
able—then informal savers may switch instruments and the social return 
from the extra dollar of savings (the difference between the new return 
and the previous very low return) might be very high.
A complementary explanation for low intermediation relates to the 
high informality in labor markets in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) find that in Mexico self-employed poor 
individuals receive above market rates of return for very small capi-
tal investments. Not surprisingly, these self-employed individuals tend 
to reinvest heavily in their own family business, buying goods such 
as refrigerators, trucks, or any other type of durable good that could 
simultaneously satisfy a consumption need for the household and serve 
as a capital good for their home business. 24 Unfortunately, McKenzie 
and Woodruff also find that with each additional investment, the mar-
ginal return declines steeply. Thus, these small capital investments may 
make sense for self-employed individuals or households but are an inef-
ficient use of savings from an aggregate, economy-wide perspective. 
While no similar estimates of individual returns are available for other 
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countries in the region, clearly Mexico is not the only country in the 
region with a large percentage of self-employed, informal entrepre-
neurs in the economy.
Informality in labor markets also creates a potential barrier to access 
formal financial instruments because labor income from informal sources 
is more volatile and is more likely to be paid out in cash. Evidence from 
surveys conducted in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru supports these patterns. 
A higher proportion of households working in the formal economy have 
access to formal saving instruments, while a higher proportion of infor-
mal workers save using informal instruments. In Mexico, 11 percent of 
households working in the informal labor market save formally com-
pared to 34 percent of households working in the formal economy. In 
Peru, the gap is even larger: 16 percent versus 49 percent. In Brazil, this 
gap is negligible: 10 percent versus 11 percent.
Accounting for the Unbanked
Much has been written on the potential obstacles to accessing credit 
while the potential problems of accessing formal financial savings instru-
ments have been less studied. The World Bank’s 2014 Global Financial 
Development Report summarizes both sets of literature and analyzes 
the accompanying FINDEx dataset in order to determine the most 
important potential obstacles to greater financial savings, and hence 
to deeper financial intermediation. One interesting finding is the impor-
tance of cost and distance as significant deterrents to opening or using 
a bank account.25
Employing a cross-section of the 2011 FINDEx dataset, Rojas-Suárez, 
and Amado (2014) analyze similar issues, but specifically focus on Latin 
America to explain the region’s “financial inclusion gap.” They highlight 
three particular aspects: the quality of institutions, the level of income 
inequality at the macro level, and the level of education at the individual 
level.
Powell (2016) confirms the first set of results using the 2011 and 
2014 FINDEx datasets. The variable “rule of law” (which is considered 
a proxy for the quality of institutions) and the country “Gini coefficient” 
(a measure of country inequality) are both significant in explaining the 
proportion of people that have an account in a financial institution. 
Stronger institutions and greater equality are associated with a higher 
percentage of individuals with accounts in financial institutions.
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Source: Authors’ calculations using the Findex Macro Database (World Bank, 2014b).
Note: Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and venezuela.
Comparators: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bo-
tswana, Bulgaria, China, P.R.: Mainland, Congo, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Estonia, Gabon, Georgia, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Rep., Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
FYR, Malaysia, Mauritius, Montenegro, Morocco, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
Rich non comparators: Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Kingdom of, Belgium, Canada, China, P.R.: Hong 
Kong, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.
Poor non comparators: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Taiwan Prov.of China, Tajikistan, 
Togo, Uganda, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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Figure 3.7 plots the percentage of individuals with a bank account 
against rule of law and each country’s Gini coefficient for Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean countries, countries with similar levels of income 
(comparators) as well as richer (rich non-comparators) and poorer 
(poor non-comparators) countries. The relationship with rule of law 
is strong, although countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
appear somewhat more dispersed than comparator countries. There 
is more overall dispersion in the case of inequality, although Latin 
America and the Caribbean countries appear to obey the relation-
ship more strongly than some other country groups. For example, 
rich countries typically have a very high percentage of individuals 
with bank accounts irrespective of the level of inequality while, in the 
case of poorer countries, the opposite tends to be true. The negative 
relationship is then driven by Latin America and the Caribbean and 
comparator countries.
The FINDEx dataset also includes data at the individual level. Thus, 
whether a person has a bank account or not can be looked at as a func-
tion of individual as well as country level characteristics. Individual 
characteristics such as age, income, gender and the level of education 
are all significant determinants of whether an individual has a financial 
account (see Powell, 2016). Women are significantly less likely to have 
a formal financial account than men, while richer individuals are more 
likely to have one. The level of education turns out to be highly signifi-
cant: individuals with secondary and tertiary education are much more 
likely to have an account.
Interestingly, the country’s overall inequality is not significant. While 
income is an important determinant of whether a person has a bank 
account, the country’s overall income inequality is not. However, when 
the Gini coefficient is interacted with income quintiles, from the poorest 
20 percent of individuals to the richest 20 percent, the results change. 
The probability of an individual in a lower income quintile being banked 
depends greatly on the overall country Gini. Neither the Gini nor the 
income quintiles by themselves are significant. However, the interac-
tion between the two variables is significant. Individuals of lower income 
quintiles tend not to be banked particularly when the country’s income 
inequality is high (see Figure 3.8). The more unequal the society, the less 
likely lower income families are to be banked. Instead, for richer house-
holds, a country’s income inequality has little bearing on their probability 
of being banked.
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Figure 3.8 Marginal Impact of Inequality for Different Income Groups
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2011 data from the World Bank’s Findex Micro Database.
Note: The figures illustrate that the probability of having a bank account falls sharply for lower in-
come groups as inequality rises while inequality has little eect on rich households. The estimates 
known as margins plots stem from the estimates of a probit regression and use Findex microdata 
for the dependent variable (the probability of having an account in a financial institution, post oce 
or microfinancial institution). The explanatory variable in each case is the country Gini coecient 
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This result is consistent with an explanation that factors in the behav-
ior of banks and other financial institutions. If there is a fixed cost for 
using formal financial institutions for savings, then only people with suffi-
cient resources will use those services. Banks will tend to open branches 
in communities where richer households will use banking services. If 
entry barriers to banking are high, the combination of fixed costs and 
economic inequality may limit the size of banking systems. The result is 
a financial system that remains relatively small and inefficient and caters 
largely to wealthier households. Regional inequalities may exacerbate 
this pattern. In a larger country, banks will naturally locate in areas where 
richer households reside. Financial institutions may steer clear of poorer 
areas, leaving poorer households to travel larger distances and face even 
higher costs in order to be banked. The location decision of banks, cou-
pled with fixed and variable transport costs and economic inequality, 
leads to a banking sector focused on wealthier households of limited size 
and hence of higher costs, concentrated in specific geographic locations. 
A large share of poorer households are left with no banks nearby and are 
very likely unbanked.
The Link between Financial Access and Savings: The Case of 
Mexico
Typically, empirical work suggests that saving is determined by a set of 
country-level variables and individual or household characteristics. This 
type of analysis suggests that saving is low in the region due to macro-
economic uncertainty, weak institutions, or low household income, for 
example.26 A drawback of this type of analysis is that it ignores the link 
between savings behavior and financial access. Without finer, within-
country information, it is impossible to tease out the nature of the link 
between the two. It is generally assumed that financial access is driven 
by the same factors that also govern savings.
At the other extreme, a body of literature considers specific inter-
ventions that frequently involve improving access to financial services. 
In general, these studies find that such interventions may well result in 
greater use of financial services—both credit and saving instruments 
(see Chapter 9).
There is comparatively less literature on how financial presence (or 
access) affects saving behavior in an entire country.27 There are two main 
reasons why such analyses have not been attempted. First, published 
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household surveys typically do not include information on the location 
of the household. Second, good information on the precise location of 
different types of financial services also may not be available. Mexico 
does have the requisite information, however, and allows for an analysis 
not only of how financial access affects saving behavior, but also of how 
financial institutions may make location decisions. Moreover, Mexico is a 
large country with considerable heterogeneity and has enjoyed signifi-
cant financial deepening (see Figure 3.9).
Mexico is thus an ideal country to consider the links between financial 
access and savings. Interestingly, the distribution of financial institutions 
by municipality is highly skewed. Some municipalities have many finan-
cial institutions but many municipalities have just one or none at all (see 
Figure 3.10).28
 Naturally, there is a big divide between urban and rural areas. Many 
urban municipalities have numerous financial institutions, while many 
rural municipalities have none at all.29 Moreover, access to a financial 
institution varies considerably depending on household income. Indeed, 
some 93 percent of households in the top decile have relatively easy 
access to a financial institution (defined as at least one institution in their 
locality), while those in lower income deciles do not. For example, only 
28 percent of households in the lowest income decile have a financial 
institution nearby (see Figure 3.11).30
Figure 3.9 The Process of Financial Deepening in Mexico
a. Year 2009 b. Year 2013
No Branches (0-1.07] per 10,000 inhabitants
(1.71-2.53] per 10,000 inhabitants
(2.53-132.45] per 10,000 inhabitants
(1.07-1.71] per 10,000 inhabitants
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Powell and Székely (2015).
Note: Territorial shading illustrates the number of bank branches per 10,000 inhabitants at the mu-
nicipal level in Mexico. The cut-off points were obtained by generating quartiles according to the 2013 
distribution, excluding the municipalities that do not have a bank branch.
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 Banks will naturally tend to open where they expect to find a market 
for their services. The number of financial institutions increases in munic-
ipalities with fewer poorer households. Moreover, crime rates seem to 
be positively related with financial institution presence. One explanation 
may be that in high crime areas, it is more important to keep savings safe 






















Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Powell and Székely (2015).
Figure 3.11  Percentage of Households with Access to Financial Institutions 


















Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Powell and Székely (2015).
Note: Includes 2012 data from the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares (ENIGH), 
2013 data from the National Dictionary of Economic Units, and 2013 data from the National Banking 
Commission.
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in a bank rather than at home. Municipal efficiency is also correlated with 
higher financial presence (see Powell and Székely, 2015).
Interestingly, the presence of a high school is associated with a 
larger bank presence. Not every municipality in Mexico has a high school. 
Municipalities are generally keen to obtain such an honor, which may be 
awarded by the state or federal authorities. One explanation for this rela-
tionship is that more people circulate in municipalities with high schools; 
parents transport their children back and forth to school, and teachers 
and other personnel come and go to work. Thus, placing a branch in an 
area with a school rather than one without a school brings greater con-
venience to a larger number of people. It reduces transaction costs, or 
what is referred to as “shoe-leather” costs. The decision as to where 
schools are located is not automatic; location decisions appear to be 
driven as much by politics as by any other factor. These considerations 
potentially make school location a useful variable to explain financial 
presence that is not directly related to savings.31
How does financial presence affect savings decisions? To research 
this question, several years of household surveys and information 
regarding financial presence were matched at the municipality level. A 
difficulty is that banks will locate where they think households will use 
their services. Hence, the measures of financial presence are not used 
directly. Rather what is used is the estimated financial presence using 
the preferred proxy: namely, high school presence. As the location of 
high schools is unrelated per se to savings behavior directly but is a 
good predictor of bank presence, it appears to be a valid instrument 
for this analysis.32 The main result is that financial savings do indeed 
increase with financial presence where financial presence is estimated 
using high school presence as a proxy (see Powell and Székely, 2015).
In theory, the effect could go either way. With financial institutions 
close by, households might save less, as they might then have more 
opportunities to borrow in case of a negative shock. However, the results 
suggest that the lower costs of greater proximity to a financial institution 
outweigh this potential effect.
The Missing Link
Ideally, people save, deposit their savings in financial institutions, which 
in turn allocate those savings to productive investments in the economy 
that fuel overall growth and development. Financial intermediaries are, 
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therefore, the crucial link between savers and investors. Unfortunately, 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, financial intermediation is the miss-
ing link, the break in the chain between savings and investment that 
determines the quality of saving in the region. Increasing access and use 
of financial institutions are keys to deepening the financial system and 
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for not having a bank account, with 23 percent and 20 percent giving 
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31 In other words, it may be a useful “instrument” in an “instrumental 
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